We identify a natural counterpart of the standard GARP for demand data in which goods are all indivisible. We show that the new axiom (DARP, for "discrete 
Introduction
When goods are perfectly divisible, Afriat (1967) 's theorem tells us that the general axiom of revealed preference (GARP) is a necessary and sufficient condition for consumption data to be consistent with utility maximization (see, e.g., Diewert, 1973; Varian, 1982) .
The proof of the result is fully constructive, namely yields an explicit well-behaved utility function when GARP is satisfied. In the standard formulation of GARP, it is understood that rational preferences are locally nonsatiated. However, in practice, goods are often indivisible and traded in discrete quantities in the field or in the laboratory. In this case, as recently acknowledged by Polisson and Quah (2013) and Fujishige and Yang (2012) , local nonsatiation becomes meaningless so that GARP, in its usual form, is no longer a necessary condition of rationalization.
"Does this mean that we should drop or modify GARP when studying consumer choice over a discrete consumption space? " ask Polisson and Quah (2013, p.31) . They answer "no" by considering a broader notion of rationality. We take another direction and do modify GARP by elaborating a new axiom that accounts fully for the discrete structure of the consumption space.
This note proposes an analog of Afriat's theorem in the case where all goods are indivisible. The data consist of finitely many observed prices and consumption bundles that the consumer could afford given his budget. In particular, we assume that the analyst observes the consumer's revenue at each date. The reason for this assumption is that, if the consumption space is discrete, a rational consumer with monotonic preferences does not necessarily exhaust his revenue. Consumption of a bundle x at price p is compatible with any budget above p · x and below p · (x + 1).
1 The data considered in this paper 1 Echenique et al. (2011b) already assume that the consumer's income is part of the data, both in the case of indivisible goods and infinitely divisible goods. In the latter framework, Forges and Minelli (2009) even assume that the analyst has access to a full description of general, possibly complex, budget sets, while Forges and Iehlé (2013) explore a minimalist approach in which the analyst only observes the consumers' budget constraints insofar as they are revealed by his choices.
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are not only appropriate in the understood idealized, theoretical framework, in which all consumption goods are indivisible, but also in experimental designs in which the designer controls the budget of the subjects. For instance, our setting is adequate to describe the economic environment in the experiments conducted by Février and Visser (2004) , Hammond and Traub (2012) and Mattei (2000) where subjects, endowed with a given budget (e.g., tokens), face discrete choices.
We identify a discrete axiom of revealed preference (DARP) and show that it is necessary and sufficient for rationalization of our data. We start by defining a relation of direct preference, exactly as for the standard GARP. More precisely, let x and x ′ be bundles of indivisible goods that have been purchased at price p and p ′ respectively; the bundle x is directly revealed preferred to the bundle x ′ if x ′ was feasible at price p given the consumer's budget. We go on by defining an indirect revealed preference relation as the transitive closure of the previous relation. A set of observations satisfies DARP if, whenever a bundle x is indirectly revealed preferred to a bundle x ′ the bundle x + 1, which is obtained by adding one unit of every good to x, is not feasible at price p ′ . DARP can thus be described as a discrete analog of GARP, in which the interior of a budget set consists of those bundles that remain in the budget set when all their components increase by one unit. As expected, DARP implies GARP but the reverse is not true.
Our main result (proposition 1) states that DARP, as described above, is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rationalization of a finite set of discrete data by a discrete quasi-concave and monotonic utility function. Surprisingly, the proof can still make use of Afriat's methodology. The key difference is that, extended over a continuous consumption space, our utility function would be flat on a small domain. However, its restriction to integer bundles turns out to be well-behaved, in particular monotonic.
So far, the utility function that we have proposed to rationalize the data when DARP is satisfied is monotonic but not strictly monotonic, while the latter property is specially desirable in the context of indivisible goods. We show (in proposition 2) that a strengthening of DARP, which we denote as DARP*, is necessary and sufficient for rationalization 3 by a strictly monotonic utility function. As in the continuous case, a basic tool to establish propositions 1 and 2 is that DARP and DARP* are equivalent to the cyclical consistency of matrices that are associated to the data. This property is formalized in proposition 3.
Related literature
Polisson and Quah (2013) also investigate the problem of revealed preferences in the context of indivisible goods but adopt a different approach. To solve the problem that is generated by the lack of meaningful local nonsatiation, Polisson and Quah (2013) allow for an implicit additional consumption good, which can be purchased in continuous quantities.
Formally their model of rationality comes close to the standard consumer problem with quasilinear utility where the additional good plays the role of money. They show that this is enough to guarantee that the standard GARP be a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a strictly increasing utility function on the discrete consumption space that rationalizes price and demand observations. In Fujishige and Yang (2012) , an identical conclusion is obtained without any additional good but the problem related to local nonsatiation is evicted right away by assuming cost efficiency.
Models with continuous goods and money are central in Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) and Sákovics (2013) . They introduce an axiom that is stronger than GARP, which they call respectively cyclical monotonicity condition and axiom of revealed valuation. They show that such an axiom is relevant for rationalization by a quasilinear utility when the data consist of finitely many observed prices and bundles of continuous goods. A similar conclusion is reached as a by-product in Echenique et al. (2011a Echenique et al. ( , p.1211 . In any case, as soon as the presence of (continuous) money is explicitly acknowledged, imposing discrete quantities for the consumption goods becomes innocuous from a revealed preference perspective and an identical test applies for rationalizing the data.
Recently, independently of our work, Cosaert and Demuynck (2014) Starting with Richter (1966 Richter ( , 1971 , the relationship between the existence of a rationalization and the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP) has also been investigated in abstract environment of choices. As recalled by Mas-Colell et al. (1995, chap.3, p.92) , this approach can be applied to competitive budget sets. Echenique et al. (2011b) proceed in this way to deal with indivisibilities (see also Chambers and Echenique (2009) in the framework of finite lattices). In this paper we rather follow Afriat's constructive approach, which enables us to check whether the possible rationalization is well-behaved (monotone, concave, etc.).
Notations and terminology.
The vector 1 is the characteristic vector of R K whose components are all equal to 1;
and for any ℓ = 1, . . . , K, e ℓ is the vector of R K whose component ℓ is 1 and remaining components are all 0. The mapping u :
is, 1 A (x) = 1 if x ∈ A and 1 A (x) = 0 otherwise; and A c is the complement of A in
. . , x m ∈ A, with m ∈ N, and every
Rationalization and DARP
Consider an analyst observing at each date t = 1, . . . , n the bundle x t ∈ R K + purchased by a single consumer, the positive prices p t ∈ R K ++ and the available budget r t ∈ R + . The consumption set is N K , and the budget set at any date t is
Throughout the analysis we assume that the observations (x t , p t , r t ) t=1,...,n satisfy x t ∈ B t at each date t = 1, . . . , n.
To assess whether the consumer behaves rationally, the analyst can use this basic data to check whether the observed choices match the solutions of the standard consumer problem.
Definition 1 A utility function u : N K → R is called a rationalization of the observations
To formulate our axiom we proceed as usual by defining first the direct revealed preference relation, denoted by R. The bundle x i is said to be directly revealed preferred
. The transitive closure of R is denoted by H, and x i is said to be 6 revealed preferred to x s if x i Hx s .
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Definition 2 The observations (x t , p t , r t ) t=1,...,n satisfy the discrete axiom of revealed preference (DARP) if for any i, j = 1, . . . , n
Remark 1 Observe that the previous definition makes sense if i = j, in which case it
implies that
. This is clearly a sine qua non condition for the existence of an increasing rationalization.
Comparison with other formulations of GARP
Now that DARP is formally defined, we can enter the details of the comparison between our approach and the other recent ones that were mentioned in the introduction, namely, Polisson and Quah (2013) and Cosaert and Demuynck (2014) . Polisson and Quah (2013) study to which extent the standard GARP, which is tailored for perfectly divisible goods (and linear budget sets), is still appropriate when goods are indivisible.
Let us first recall the definition of GARP that is used in Polisson and Quah (2013):
The observations (p t , x t ) t=1,...,n satisfy GARP if for every ordered subset {i, j, k, . . . , r, s} ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, the inequalities
cannot hold unless they are all equalities.
Written in this way, GARP can be applied to discrete bundles x t and is a stronger requirement than DARP. The observations in figure 1 are consistent with DARP but not with GARP, while those in figure 2 violate both DARP and GARP.
The relationship between DARP and GARP can be better understood by recalling an equivalent formulation of the latter axiom in the case of perfectly divisible goods. To this 3 That is, x i Hx s if there exists an ordered subset {i, j, k, . . . , r, s} ⊂ {1, . . . , n} such that 
Then DARP says that for every i, j = 1, . . . , n,
On the other hand, if there exists a well-behaved (say, increasing) utility function defined all over R K + (i.e., u : R K + → R) such that x t solves max u(x) subject to x ∈ C t , we must have r t = p t · x t for every t = 1, . . . , n. By defining the direct revealed preference relation R c by (x i R c x j if x j ∈ C i ) and the relation H c as its transitive closure, we get that observations (p t , x t ) t=1,...,n satisfy GARP iff for any i, j = 1, . . . , n,
While the latter formulation of GARP is only relevant in the case of perfectly divisible goods, it shows that DARP and GARP express exactly the same consistency property, the only difference being discrete space versus continuous space. It is thus tempting to say that DARP appears as the right version of GARP when goods are indivisible. 
These budget sets are of course not finite nor linear, but one can still define a direct pref-
It is readily checked that WMARP is just GARP for the general budgets B ′ t (see Forges and Minelli, 2009 ) and that if, at every date t, the finite budget sets are generated by discrete linear budget sets B t , as in the current paper, WMARP and DARP are equivalent.
When WMARP holds, Cosaert and Demuynck (2014) construct a utility function over the whole R K + , by adapting Afriat's methodology to nonlinear budget sets, exactly as in Forges and Minelli (2009) . This utility function has no particular property beyond monotonicity. As it will become clear in section 4, our application of Afriat's methodology keeps track of the linear structure behind the discrete budget sets, which allows us to derive a quasi-concave utility function.
The previous discussion suggests that the reason which makes GARP, in its standard form, inappropriate to deal with indivisible goods, does not come from the indivisibilities themselves but rather from the nonlinearities that they generate. By making further assumptions on the model, Polisson and Quah (2013) nevertheless reconcile the standard GARP with indivisible goods.
In the situation depicted by figure 1, suppose that the consumer behaves according to Eq.(1), then he is necessarily indifferent between x 1 and x 2 . It follows that his choices do not meet cost efficiency since p 1 · x 2 < p 1 · x 1 . Such a situation is excluded by allowing either for an implicit continuous good (Polisson and Quah, 2013) or for money (Brown and Calsamiglia, 2007; Sákovics, 2013) , or by imposing cost efficiency (Fujishige and Yang, 2012) . But, nothing prevents rationality as given by Eq.(1) only to coexist with cost inefficiencies if goods are available only in discrete quantities. In figure 1 , the consumer has no way to take advantage from the monetary gain that results from choosing x 2 instead of x 1 , at date 1.
In what follows we will show that DARP is the appropriate condition for consumption data to be consistent with utility maximization, in the sense of Eq. (1), as long as all goods are traded in discrete quantities.
Results
The next proposition is our first main result.
Proposition 1
The observations (x t , p t , r t ) t=1,...,n satisfy DARP if, and only if, there exists a discrete quasi-concave and monotonic rationalization of the observations. One shortcoming of the result is that we do not obtain a strictly monotonic rationalization. The following example shows that, under DARP, there is no hope in general to get such a property.
Example
Let [x 1 = (5, 4); p 1 = (1, 3.2)] and [x 2 = (7, 3); p 2 = (3, 2)] be the set of observed bundles and prices, and assume that r 1 = p 1 · x 1 and r 2 = p 2 · x 2 . The observations satisfy DARP and, by proposition 1, there exists a monotonic rationalization u which necessarily satisfies u(x 1 ) = u(x 2 ) since x 1 and x 2 are both affordable at both dates. Note that y := x 2 + (1, 0) = (8, 3) is also affordable at date 1. Therefore, the utility function u cannot be strictly monotonic, otherwise u(y) > u(x 2 ) = u(x 1 ) would contradict that x 1 has been purchased at date 1. Figure 1 illustrates this example.
Let us now define a stronger axiom than DARP to obtain strict monotonicity. Given the set of observations, let c(t) be one of the cheapest goods at date t, that is, c(t) ∈ argmin{p g t : g = 1, . . . , K}.
Definition 3
The observations (x t , p t , r t ) t=1,...,n satisfy DARP* if for any i, j = 1, . . . , n
In figure 1 the bundle y is affordable at date 1, hence the set of observations does not pass DARP*. Using DARP* we obtain our second main result, which is the analog to proposition 1 with the additional property of strict monotonicity.
Proposition 2 The observations (x t , p t , r t ) t=1,...,n satisfy DARP* if, and only if, there exists a discrete quasi-concave and strictly monotonic rationalization of the observations.
To see why DARP and DARP* refer to one or the other version of monotonicity observe simply that DARP* amounts to: for any i, j = 1, . . . , n, x i Hx j implies {x i } +
Finally, it is worth pointing out that DARP and DARP* can be restated in terms of an operational property of cyclical consistency, as it is also the case for GARP.
5 Such a distinction has no bite if one considers GARP, as long as prices are positive, since
In other words, one gets strict monotonicity for free in the continuous case.
Definition 4 An n × n real matrix A = (a jk ) j,k=1,...,n is cyclically consistent if, for any ordered subset {j, k, ℓ, . . . , r} ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, a jk ≤ 0, a kℓ ≤ 0, ..., a rj ≤ 0 implies all terms are 0.
Given the observations (x t , p t , r t ) t=1,...,n , let β = (β jk ) j,k=1,...,n be the n × n matrix where: β jk ∈ {−1, 0, +1}; β jk ≤ 0 if x k ∈ B j , with strict inequality iff x k + 1 ∈ B j ; β jk = +1 if x k / ∈ B j . Letβ be the matrix whereβ jk ∈ {−1, 0, +1};β jk ≤ 0 if x k ∈ B j , with strict inequality iff
The next proposition will be useful in the proofs of propositions 1 and 2 and can be established by standard arguments (see, e.g., Forges and Minelli, 2009, p.138 ).
inequalities. We obtain then ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n and δ 1 , . . . , δ n > 0 such that u :
as follows is a well-behaved rationalization of the observations:
where
A potential difficulty with our construction is that the desirable properties of a utility function are not a priori granted here, contrary to the standard competitive case where the utility function can be taken as the infimum of linear and increasing functions.
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To establish proposition 2, we can proceed identically by using the entries of the data matrixβ. In that case the resulting utility function is strictly monotonic.
Proof of proposition 1
We first show that DARP is necessary for utility maximization. Let u be a monotonic rationalization of the observations (x t , p t , r t ) t=1,...,n and {j, k, ℓ, . . . , r} be an ordered subset of {1, . . . , n} such that β jk ≤ 0, β kℓ ≤ 0 ,..., β rj ≤ 0. For any two consecutive elements a, b ∈ {j, k, ℓ, . . . , r}, u(x a ) ≥ u(x b ). The entire sequence of inequalities implies that u(x a ) = u(x b ) for every a, b ∈ {j, k, ℓ, . . . , r}. By construction, if β ab < 0 for two consecutive elements a, b ∈ {j, k, ℓ, . . . , r} then x b + 1 ∈ B a and u(
u is monotonic. It contradicts that x a has been purchased at date a. Hence DARP is satisfied from Proposition 3.
We show now the converse implication. Suppose that (x t , p t , r t ) t=1,...,n satisfies DARP and define a new data matrix γ, with entries γ jk = |β jk | (p j · x k − r j ). From Proposition 3, β satisfies cyclical consistency. It is an easy matter to check that it is also the case for 8 In the competitive case the rationalizationū : R K + → R can be constructed as follows:ū(x) = min ψ 1 +δ 1 p 1 · (x − x 1 ), . . . ,ψ n +δ n p n · (x − x n ) for someψ 1 , . . . ,ψ n andδ 1 , . . . ,δ n > 0. In the case of finite choice sets, Cosaert and Demuynck (2014) use a different strategy to construct the rationalization.
In our setting it comes down to the following function u : N K → R (not necessarily discrete quasi-concave):
some ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n and δ 1 , . . . , δ n > 0.
the matrix γ since, in particular, γ jk ≤ 0 iff p j · x k − r j ≤ 0 iff β jk ≤ 0. We can obtain therefore the following Afriat's inequalities (see, e.g., Fostel et al., 2004) . 9 There exist ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n and δ 1 , . . . , δ n > 0 such that
For every t = 1, . . . , n, define
Let u : N K → R be defined as follows:
Let us show that the function u rationalizes the experiment.
From the definition of β, it holds that u(
. . , ψ n + δ n γ nt for any t = 1, . . . , n.
Since γ tt = 0, from the Afriat's inequalities, Eq.( * ), we get that u(x t ) = ψ t .
Next, we consider x ∈ B t . It holds that
by using δ t , 1 At (x) ≥ 0 and p t · x − r t ≤ 0.
Hence u rationalizes the data. Clearly the function is monotonic (but not strictly monotonic). The next lemma concludes the proof of proposition 1.
Lemma 1
The function u is discrete quasi-concave. 9 The existence of a solution to the Afriat's inequalities relies only on the cyclical consistency of the matrix.
Proof To make use of customary arguments, let us assume first that the mapping u, constructed before, is defined on X = R K + instead of N K (idem for the sets A t , t = 1, . . . , n).
We prove that u is quasi-concave. Note that quasi-concavity is invariant to pointwise infimum of quasi-concave functions. Hence it suffices to prove quasi-concavity for the functions f t (x) := (p t · x − r t )1 At (x), t = 1, . . . , n.
It amounts to showing that for each x, x ′ ∈ X and λ ≥ 0, f t (λx + (1 − λ)x ′ ) ≥ min{f t (x), f t (x ′ )}. Let X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ∈ X be three disjoint sets defined as follows: X 1 = {x ∈ X : p t · x − (r t − p t · 1) ≤ 0}, X 2 = A t (x), X 3 = {x ∈ X : p t · x − r t > 0 . It is an easy matter to check that X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 1 ∪ X 2 , X 2 ∪ X 3 are all convex sets (note also that X = ∪ i=1,...,3 X i ). We need to consider several cases.
If x, x ′ ∈ X i , for some i = 1, . . . 3, then λx + (1 − λ)x ′ ∈ X i and the required inequality is verified since either f t = 0 (case X 2 ) or f t is affine (cases X 1 and X 3 ). If x ∈ X 2 and x ′ ∈ X 3 , then λx+(1−λ)x ′ ∈ X 2 ∪X 3 ; it follows that f t (x ′ ) ≥ f t (λx+(1−λ)x ′ ) ≥ f t (x) = 0 (either f t (λx+(1−λ)x ′ ) = 0 if λx+(1−λ)x ′ ∈ X 2 or f t (λx+(1−λ)x ′ ) = (1−λ)(p t ·x ′ −r t ) > 0 if λx + (1 − λ)x ′ ∈ X 3 ). The same reasoning applies to the case x ∈ X 2 and x ′ ∈ X 1 .
Finally, it remains to consider the case x ∈ X 1 and x ′ ∈ X 3 . Either λx+(1−λ)x ′ ∈ X 1 ∪X 3 and then f t (λx+(1−λ)x ′ ) = λ(p t ·x−r t )+(1−λ)(p t ·x ′ −r t ) ≥ f t (x) since f t (x) < p t ·x ′ −r t ; or λx + (1 − λ)x ′ ∈ X 2 , and then f t (λx + (1 − λ)x ′ ) = 0 ≥ f t (x) since x ∈ X 1 implies p t · (x + 1) − r t ≤ 0 which implies in turn f t (x) ≤ 0.
Hence u is quasi-concave on R K + . Clearly, the restriction of u to N K is a fortiori discrete quasi-concave.
Proof of proposition 2
The proof is readily analogous to the one of proposition 1 and amounts to replacing the vector 1 by e c(t) at each date t. We omit that tedious repetition. However let us show explicitly how we obtain a rationalization that is strictly monotonic, in the only if part of the proof.
